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IN THE SUPREME COURT IN AND FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH

ST. BENEDICT'S DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a general partnership,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
THE BOYER COMPANY

vs.
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL, a
Utah non-profit corporation,
and THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

(Subject to Assignment to
Utah Court of Appeals)
Appellate Case No. 89-0449

Defendants/
Respondents.

Priority 14(b)

I.
JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j).

II.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Appellant

St.

Benedict's

Development

Company

("Develpment Company") brought this action seeking to recover
damages

and to enjoin Respondents

St. Benedictfs

Hospital

("Hospital") and The Boyer Company ("Boyer") from constructing

an office building on property owned by Hospital which is
adjacent to St. Benedict's Hospital and also adjacent to certain
office buildings constructed on land leased by Development
Company from the Hospital in Ogden, Utah.

Development Company

also sought damages for an alleged tortious interference with
business relationships.
Boyer

and

the Hospital

both moved

to dismiss the

Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.

The court granted the motions and the Order of

Dismissal was signed September 28, 1989.

Development Company

filed its Notice of Appeal on October 16, 1989.

III.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The following issues are presented for review on this
appeal.
1.

Did the District Court commit error in dismissing

Development Company's claim which sought to prevent the Hospital
and Boyer from constructing an office building on the Hospital's
property where no restrictive covenant existed between the
Hospital and Development Company by which the Hospital agreed
not to construct such a building and where there was no basis
for implying such a covenant?
2.

Did the District Court commit error in dismissing
2

Development

Company's

claim

for tortious

interference with

business relations where there were no factual allegations that
in negotiating with the Hospital to construct an office building
on the Hospital's property or soliciting tenants to rent space
in the proposed new building Boyer acted for an improper purpose
or with improper means?

IV.

INTRODUCTION

Development Company filed this lawsuit to try to obtain
from the courts the benefit of a bargain which Development
Company

itself never made or paid

for with the Hospital.

Development Company sought to be protected
competition

for

tenants

in

Development

from legitimate
Company's

office

buildings located on land adjacent to, and leased from, St.
Benedict's Hospital. Without any colorable basis for doing so,
Development Company added Boyer as a Defendant — a company with
whom Development Company never dealt or had any relationship.
Development Company sought compensatory and punitive damages and
an injunction against Boyer without any factual allegations of
wrongdoing on Boyer's part solely because Boyer negotiated with
the Hospital to construct another office building near St.
Benedict's Hospital and announced
Company's tenants and the public.
3

its plans to Development

For

the

respectfully
dismissed
Development

reasons

submitted

the

that

Complaint

Company

a

hereinafter
the

and

set

District

properly

forth,
Court

refused

judicially-mandated

it

is

properly
to

award

monopoly.

That

dismissal should be affirmed.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

Development Company commenced this action in June, 1989,
seeking injunctive relief and damages.

Development Company

alleged in conclusory fashion that the activity of the Hospital
and Boyer in planning to construct an office building adjacent
to St. Benedict's Hospital somehow breached the Hospitalfs prior
agreements with Development Company.
As previously stated, Boyer and the Hospital both filed
motions to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

on the basis that the

Complaint failed to state a claim for relief.

After extensive

briefing and oral argument, the court, the Honorable David E.
Roth, granted the motions. The Order of Dismissal was signed on
September 28, 1989.

4

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS,

The motions to dismiss were granted solely on the basis
of the allegations of the Complaint•

Of course, the well-pled

factual allegations of the Complaint must be accepted as true
for the purposes of this appeal.

The essential allegations of

the Complaint can be summarized as follows:
1.

On or about July 6, 1977, the Hospital, as lessor,

entered into a lease with Development Company's predecessor, by
the terms of which the Hospital leased a portion of its real
property immediately adjacent to the Hospital facility to the
lessee to construct, maintain and operate a medical professional
building and other facilities related thereto. [R. 2]
2. The lease was intended for the mutual benefit of the
parties and to benefit the Hospital in providing facilities for
medical staff using the facilities of the Hospital for the care
and treatment of patients. [R. 3]
3.

The lease was for a period of 51 years at a rate of

$1.00 per year, which nominal rental was in recognition of the
fact that an office building in close proximity to the Hospital
was essential to the success of the Hospital.

The Hospital was

given a right of first refusal to purchase the leasehold
interest of the lessee in the event the lessee decided to sell.
[R. 3-4]
4.

At all times since the lease was entered into, the

parties acted upon the "express and implied
5

condition and

understanding" that the operation of the Hospital and office
building would be conducted "for the mutual economic advantage
and benefit of the parties" and "that neither party would
conduct itself in such a way as to cause diminution of patients
of the Hospital or tenants of the professional building."

[R.

5-6]
5.

On or about June 22, 1979, the parties signed an

additional agreement providing for the construction of a second
office building to accommodate other medical doctors and related
professionals.

In that second agreement, the Hospital agreed

that it would "actively assist the partnership in acquiring and
holding good tenants until such time as the new office building
is completely occupied," and guaranteed payment of rent for a
third of the net leasable area of the new office building until
the new office building was two-thirds occupied.

[R. 6-7]

There is no allegation in the Complaint that the Hospital did
not actively assist the partnership in acquiring tenants until
the new office building was occupied or failed to meet its
guaranty obligation.
6.

On December 14, 1981, the parties entered into a

Replacement Lease with respect to the second property wherein
the parties reconfirmed their mutual interest in Development
Company constructing and maintaining professional offices and
facilities

for the use and benefit of doctors engaged

treating their patients at the Hospital.

in

Development Company

agreed that insofar as practical and subject to tenant demand,
6

tenancies in the professional building would be limited to
members of the professional staff of the Hospital.
7.

[R. 7-8]

On December 14, 1981, Development Company and the

Hospital entered into a Declaration of Restrictions, Easements
and Common Area Maintenance Agreement.

In the preamble of that

agreement, the parties stated their intention that the parcels
be developed for the mutual benefit of the parties and therefore
they desired to establish a general plan for the development of
the parcels.
8.

[R. 8-9]
Finally, Development Company alleged that at the

time of filing of the Complaint, it had five vacancies in its
building and that there were no reasonable sources of tenants to
occupy the proposed facility to be built by Boyer without taking
tenants

from

the

Development

Company's

buildings,

that

unspecified tenants have notified the Development Company they
do not intend to renew their leases, but will occupy the spaces
on a month to month basis only until the new building is
completed,

and

professional

that

building

there was no need
to

serve

the

needs

utilizing and practicing at the Hospital.
9.
Company

for
of

an

additional

the

doctors

[R. 11-12]

By virtue of the foregoing allegations, Development

alleges

in a totally

conclusory

fashion

that the

Hospital "was bound and obligated to Plaintiff not to construct
or permit the construction of additional facilities on its
property for rental or occupancy by medical personnel practicing
7

at said hospital until such time as there was no more available
space

in

Plaintiff f s

Plaintiff
service."

the

facility,

opportunity

[R. 10-11]

to

and

then

construct

only
and

by

offering

provide

such

However, the agreements between the

Development Company and the Hospital do not provide for any such
obligation on the Hospital's part, nor did Development Company
allege the agreements did so.
10.
belief,

that

Development Company alleged, on information and
in planning

and

proceeding

with

the

proposed

development by Boyer of an additional professional building on
the

Hospital's

"knowingly,

property,

willfully

and

Boyer
in

and

the

concert

with

Hospital
each

acted

other"

in

soliciting Development Company's existing tenants to rent space
in the proposed new facility and to not renew their present
leases with the Development Company when they expire.

The

Development Company predictably concluded that Boyerfs actions
in planning the development of a competing office building and
soliciting tenants for that building once those tenants' leases
with the Development Company expired "constitute a wrongful and
unlawful interference with Plaintiff's present and prospective
contractual relationships with third parties."

8

[R. 14-15]

VI.

ARGUMENT

Faced with the simple indisputable fact that in all of
its dealings and negotiations with the Hospital over the years,
Development Company never requested, bargained for or received
any agreement which would in any way limit the Hospital's right
to use its property adjacent to that leased by Development
Company in any manner which the Hospital sees fit, Development
Company has desperately attempted in this action to come up with
some colorable basis upon which to justify asking the courts to
protect it from legitimate competition.

The district court

properly determined that there was simply no basis for the novel
claims made by Development Company and properly dismissed the
Complaint.
As Boyer shall now demonstrate, Development Company is
not entitled to preclude the Hospital from using its property
for the construction of another office building as sought in the
First Cause of Action and the allegations of the Third Cause of
Action

that

Boyer

tortiously

interfered

with

Development

Company's business relations are woefully insufficient to state
a claim for relief.

The Second Cause of Action seeks damages

solely against the Hospital and will not be discussed in this
Brief.

9

A. THE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY CANNOT PRECLUDE THE HOSPITAL
FROM UTILIZING ITS PROPERTY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANOTHER
OFFICE BUILDING,

Development Company makes a dogged attempt, both in its
Complaint and in its Brief, to ignore and camouflage the single
most important fact in this case.

That is, that there is not

one word in the agreements or communications between Development
Company and the Hospital which prohibits the Hospital from using
its own property to construct a new building or prevents the
Hospital from dealing with Boyer or any other third party with
respect to the construction, development or lease of a new
building, or which gives Development Company any exclusive right
to construct and lease any new building on the Hospital's
property.

Faced with the lack of any such provisions in the

agreements, Development Company has attempted to manufacture
such an obligation out of wholecloth and persuade this court to
grant

it

protection

from

legitimate

competition

which

Development Company never bargained for, paid for or obtained in
its agreements with the Hospital.
Because no written or even oral agreement exists or is
alleged

restricting

the

Hospital's

use

of

the

property,

Development Company is left to essentially argue that the fact
that construction and leasing of Development Company's buildings
was intended to benefit the Hospital and that the parties
contemplated

a long, mutually advantageous
10

relationship of

landlord and tenant is sufficient to entitle Development Company
to

dictate

the use

of the Hospital's

property

by

implying

restrictive covenants into the agreements between the parties.
There

is simply

no basis

in

law

for Development

Company's

position.
The

agreements

between

the Hospital

and

Development

Company involve a lease of real property for a term in excess of
one year.

Consequently, those agreements were required to be

in writing.

Section 25-5-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ; SCM Land

Company v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986).

A lessee

cannot prevent its lessor from using its own adjacent property
in any legally permissible manner absent a clearly expressed
written agreement.

Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Girsh, 2 27 P.2d 1

(Cal. 1951); Nevada Food King, Inc. v. Reno Press Brick Company,
400 P.2d

140

(Nev. 1965); Carden Hall, Inc. v. George, 290

N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (1968); Matteucchi's Super Save Drug v. Hustad
Corporation, 491 P.2d 705 (Mont. 1971); Fuller Market Basket,
Inc. v. Gillingham & Jones, Inc., 539 P.2d 868 (Wash. 1975);
Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 424 P.2d 541, 548-49 (Kan.
1967); Ready v. Texaco, Inc., 410 P.2d 983, 986 (Wyo. 1966).
For example, in Stockton Dry Goods Co, supra, plaintiff
owned

a department

store

and

entered

into

a written

lease

agreement with the defendant pursuant to which the defendant was
given the right to lease and operate a shoe department in the
store.

The defendant claimed the sole and exclusive right to

operate a shoe department based on the lease and conversations

11

between the parties.

The California Supreme Court upheld the

exclusion of any evidence as to an oral agreement and concluded
that the lease did not give the lessee the exclusive right to
operate a shoe department, observing:
It is the defendant's contention that there is
implicit in the lease of a portion of the store for
the conduct of a shoe department an agreement on
the part of the plaintiff that there would not be
another shoe department conducted in the store.
This is his contention despite the fact that such
restrictive language is not in the lease and that
a declaration to that effect would be to place a
restriction upon the plaintiff's competition with
the defendant and to create a covenant as to the
use of the portion of the premises retained by the
plaintiff without express provision therefore.
A restrictive covenant as to property retained
by a grantor or lessor must be evidenced by a
clearly expressed intention [Citations omitted]
for, as has been universally recognized, "where
words do not amount to an agreement, covenant does
not lie." [Citation omitted]
The defendant has presented no decision where
the court has read in the contract a provision for
the restrictive covenant without language to
support it. [227 P.2d at p. 3]
Similarly, in Nevada Food Kincr, Inc. . supra, a lease for
a shopping center contained an express restrictive covenant
prohibiting the lessor from leasing or operating another grocery
store in a certain specified area. The lessee sought to extend
that restrictive covenant in order to fulfill what it claimed
was the purpose and intent of the lease.

The court refused to

do so, stating:
Of course, Nevada Food King is fearful that
its business will be detrimentally affected if a
competitor is permitted to do business on adjacent
property of the lessor. Though conceding that the
proposed supermarket will not be located within the
area prohibited by the restrictive covenant, it
12

nevertheless asserts that the underlying purpose of
that covenant is frustrated by the lower court's
ruling..•• we cannot write a new lease for the
parties to accommodate the lessee, nor will we
depart from the well-established rule that a
restrictive covenant being in restraint of trade,
is to be strictly construed. [400 P.2d at p. 142]
Finally, in Carden Hall, Inc., supra, the court granted
summary judgment dismissing a Complaint seeking to limit the
manner in which a tenant could use the leased premises, stating:
Such covenants, being restrictive, are not
favored by courts and, therefore, will not be
extended by implication beyond the terms of the
restriction since a party wishing to impose
restrictions can do so by the use of clearly
understandable language. [Citation omitted] The
intention to restrict should be unmistakably
expressed in the lease, it should not be a matter
of inference. The one who seeks to enforce such
restriction has the burden of demonstrating that it
is sustained by a plain and natural interpretation
of the language used. [Citation omitted]
Some

courts

have

indicated

that

in

very

narrow

circumstances they would be willing to imply a restrictive
covenant

into

a

lease.

These

narrow

circumstances

described by the court in Stockton Dry Goods, supra:
The question may not be resolved by what the
parties might have provided had they thought about
it, nor by what the court might conclude regarding
abstract fairness. The question of what is to be
included in the contract is for the parties, not
for the court, to determine. Here the defendant
seeks to build an implied covenant upon an
inference from the fact that there had always been
but one shoe department in the store.
The
implication, however, cannot rest solely upon an
inference to be drawn from the facts surrounding
the execution of the lease. It must have a basis
in the contract itself. ...[T]he court, in Cousins
Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co... summarized the
rules when covenants may be implied as follows:
"(1) The implication must arise from the language
used or it must be indispensable to effectuate the
13

were

intention of the parties; (2) it must appear from
the language used that it was so clearly within the
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it
unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants
can only be justified on the grounds of legal
necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where
it can be rightfully assumed that it would have
been made if attention had been called to it; (5)
there can be no implied covenant where the subject
is completely covered by the contract." [227 P.2d
at 3-4]
None of these requirements are met in the present case.
There is no implication from the language of the agreements that
the Hospital's use of its adjacent property would in any way be
restricted nor is such an implication necessary to effectuate
the intent of the leases.

It does not appear from the language

of the agreements that such a restriction was "so clearly within
the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary
to express it."
opposite.

In fact, the agreements are proof of just the

The parties were very careful to document all of

their agreements.

When they reached an agreement on a matter,

they expressed it in writing.

Nor is there any legal necessity

for implying a restriction.

The only

"necessity"

is the

Development Company's desire to be protected from competition.
Finally, there is no basis for assuming the parties would have
agreed to such a major restriction had the attention of the
parties been called to it.
The cases cited by Development Company in support of its
argument that a restrictive covenant should be implied do not
support that claim and in fact demonstrate the poverty of
Development Company's position.
14

For example, Development Company relies upon Keating v.
Preston, 108 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1940).

In that case, the court

found that the lease expressly gave the tenant the exclusive
right to operate a restaurant and liquor business on the
premises of a small hotel. Based on this finding, the appellate
court simply enjoined the landlord from renting other space in
the hotel to a third party for conducting a restaurant.
Development

Company

also relies on Belvedere Hotel

Company v. Williams, 113 A. 335 (Md. 1921), a case decided when
Plessy v. Ferguson was still the law of the land.
lease

between

exclusive

the

right

to

parties

expressly

operate

establishment in the hotel.

a

gave

barbershop

the

There, the
tenant

and

the

manicuring

After the lease was entered into,

the landlord leased the front room of an adjoining building to
a barbershop.

The court found that the adjoining building was

connected with the hotel lobby through a doorway opening into
what was called the "summer garden" and was therefore part of
the hotel.

The hotel therefore concluded that the second

barbershop constituted a violation of the lease.
Development Company's reliance upon Carter v. Alder, 291
P.2d 111 (Cal.App. 1956) is similarly misplaced.

In that case,

the original landlords had given the tenant the exclusive right
to operate a supermarket in a development known as "Valley
Market Town" in Van Nuys, California.
was

entered

into,

the

landlords

Sometime after the lease
sold

their

interest

to

plaintiffs who commenced planning the development of adjacent
15

land to be part of an expansion of "Valley Market Town."
Plaintiffs

then

undertook

negotiations

with

the

tenants

attempting to negotiate a release of their exclusive right to
operate a supermarket within "Valley Market Town." The tenants
refused to release such rights. Plaintiffs then determined that
they would nevertheless construct and operate a supermarket on
the adjacent property
required

to

and

"break" the tenants which were

achieve minimum

sales as part

of

the lease.

Plaintiffs asserted they were fully entitled to operate a
supermarket on the adjoining land because it was not part of the
"Valley Market Town."

The court rejected that contention,

finding as a fact that the adjacent land was acquired in order
to expand "Valley Market Town" and that it was in fact part of
"Valley Market Town" so it was covered by the express exclusive
right granted to the tenants.

The court further found that

plaintiffs were attempting by operating a competing supermarket
to cut the tenant's income derived from its supermarket to the
point that the landlord would have the right to terminate the
lease.

Of course, under the circumstances of that case, the

court ruled against the landlord.
Development Company cites Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John
New & Associates, Inc.. 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982) for the
proposition

that

"a

contract

need

not

collateral matter or possible contingency."

provide

for

every

The Nixon case has

nothing to do with the issues involved on this appeal.

In

Nixon, the District Court had refused specific performance of a
16

real estate contract on the basis that the contract was too
vague

for

specific

performance

without

specifying

which

provisions were faulty. The Utah Supreme Court simply held that
the agreement was sufficiently certain as to its essential terms
to warrant specific performance and that the failure to specify
time for performance didn't matter because where no time is
agreed

upon

for

performance,

reasonable time to perform.

the

parties

by

law

have

a

The case had nothing to do with

implying restrictive covenants into an agreement.

Further, a

covenant restricting the Hospital from developing its adjacent
property is hardly some minor collateral matter that was not
required to be included in the written agreements.
The

case

of

Quality

Performance

Lines

v.

Yo

Ho

Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1980), cited by Development Company, also has nothing to do with the issues before the
court on this appeal. That case involved a dispute between the
plaintiff and the defendant distributor of the plaintiff's brake
shoes concerning, among other things, amounts plaintiff had
allegedly overcharged the distributor for used brake shoe core
deposits.

The court only recognized that "an implied contract

is 'one where the mutual intent [of the parties] is manifested
by particular acts and attendant circumstances'" and that under
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, the court could imply aspects
of an agreement from the parties' course of performance. Again,
the case had nothing to do with implying restrictive covenants
into agreements concerning real property.
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Development Company argues that the Hospital restricted
the type of tenants in the buildings which Development Company
leases from the Hospital and insisted that those buildings not
be used

for commercial office space.

Development Company

concludes that, "[hjaving obtained what it bargained for from
Plaintiff, Defendant Hospital should likewise be required to
allow Plaintiff to achieve its reasonable expectations flowing
from their contracts."
This

contention

Development

is

[Development Company Brief, p. 21-22]
nonsensical.

Company

is really

More

saying

accurately,

what

is that because the

Hospital bargained for and received a restriction on the type of
tenancies

in

the

Development

Company's

buildings,

the

Development Company should receive from the court something that
it never bargained for or received from the Hospital —

a

restriction on the Hospital's use of its adjacent property.
Development Company points to one paragraph in a June
1979 agreement by which the Hospital agreed to "actively assist
the partnership in acquiring and holding good tenants until such
time as the new office building is completely occupied" as
support for an implied restriction on the Hospital's use of its
adjacent property.

This argument is without merit.

In the

first place, this provision provides no basis for implying a
restrictive

covenant

under

the

authorities

cited

above.

Furthermore, there is no allegation anywhere in the Complaint
that the Hospital breached any obligation to actively assist
Development Company in this regard.
18

Finally, Development Company half-heartedly argues that
it ought to be allowed discovery before
dismissed.

its Complaint is

However, Development Company's case must stand or

fall on the specific provisions of the written agreements which
were all before the court. Development Company is not entitled
to use discovery as a device for attempting to come up with some
basis for a lawsuit.

Boyer should simply not be put to the

expense of defending this action while Development Company
wanders through discovery in search of a theory and facts to
somehow justify this case.
In conclusion, Development Company conceded in the court
below that restrictive covenants are not favored, but argued
"they

are

enforceable

legitimate interest."

if

carefully

[R. 132]

drawn

to

protect

any

Development Company simply

cannot escape the fact that there is in the present case no
restrictive covenant, carefully drawn or not, in the agreements
with the Hospital. As the district court stated in granting the
motions to dismiss:
The plaintiff wants me to find that there is
an agreement between the parties that the
defendants may not build on this property without
first offering the plaintiff the opportunity to
build similar buildings.
There is no specific
language in any contract which provides for that.
The suggestion next is that there is an
implied agreement that that's the case. If so, it
would be a restrictive covenant restricting the use
of property. And as has been pointed out by I
think all parties, those are not favored in the
law. And even by acknowledgement of the Plaintiff
that those kinds of contracts or covenants will be
enforced if they are carefully drawn to protect a
legitimate interest. And I find that there is no
such clause in the contract that's carefully drawn
19

and protecting a legitimate interest. [Transcript
of August 30, 1989 hearing, R. 205 at p. 34-35]
The District Court's decision in this regard was correct and
should be confirmed.

B.

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST BOYER

FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

Development Company alleges in the Third Cause of Action
of the Complaint that Boyer's alleged actions in planning the
construction of a new office building on the Hospital's property
and in soliciting Development Company's tenants to rent space in
the proposed new building once their leases with Development
Company expire somehow constitutes a "wrongful and unlawful
interference"

with

Development

Company's

contractual

relationships with its tenants. It is important to note in this
regard that there is absolutely no allegation or intimation that
Boyer or the Hospital has attempted to persuade Development
Company's tenants to breach their existing leases or that Boyer
or the Hospital have made any misrepresentations or otherwise
unfairly competed for the tenants.

The Complaint only alleges

that Boyer and the Hospital have sought to have the tenants
choose new office space once their leases are at an end.
There can be no doubt under the law but that Boyer is
perfectly entitled to compete with Development Company for the
future business of Development Company's tenants so long as

20

Boyer does not act with an improper purpose or with improper
means.

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293

(Utah 1982); Marmis v. Solot Co. , 573 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. 1977)
("tortious

interference

competition.11)

does

not

occur

through

lawful

In Ulan v. Vend-a-Coin, Inc., 558 P. 2d 741, 745

(Ariz. 1976), the court reversed a jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff on an interference with business expectancy claim,
observing:
Thus, it may be gleaned that the
engage in business and to compete
implies the additional privilege to
persons to do their business with the
than with his competitors.

privilege to
with others
induce third
actor rather

It is well settled that in order to state a claim for
relief for interference with prospective economic relations,
Development Company is required to allege facts showing:

(1)

that Boyer intentionally interfered with Development Company's
existing or potential economic relations; (2) for an improper
purpose or by an improper means; and (3) causing injury to
Development

Company.

Leigh

Furniture,

Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).

supra.; Sampson

v.

Development Company

has failed to even approach alleging the necessary facts in this
regard.
All

Development

Company

has alleged

is that Boyer

attempted to solicit Development Company's tenants to enter into
leases with Boyer once their leases with Development Company are
at an end.

There was nothing improper with that attempt.

Nor

is there any sufficient allegation in the Complaint that Boyer
21

acted with an improper purpose.

In order to state a claim,

Development Company was required to allege facts showing that
the predominant

purpose

of Boyer's

conduct was to

injure

Development Company and that Boyer's actions were maliciously
motivated.

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, supra;

Sampson v. Richins, supra.

See also. Top Service Body Shop,

Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Ore. 1978).

For

example, in Leigh Furniture, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In the rough and tumble of the marketplace,
competitors inevitably damage one another in the
struggle for personal advantage. The law offers no
remedy for those damages — even if intentional —
because they are an inevitable by-product of
competition.
The problems inherent in proving
motivation or purpose make it prudent for
commercial conduct to be regulated for the most
part by the improper means alternative, which
typically requires only a showing of particular
conduct.
The alternative of improper purpose would be
satisfied where it can be shown that the actor's
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.
[657 P.2d at 307] [Emphasis added]
Development Company argues in its brief [p. 24-25] that
its allegation in paragraph 41 of the Complaint should be enough
for pleading purposes to satisfy the requirement of alleging
improper means or purpose.

Paragraph

41 only alleged on

information and belief that Boyer and the Hospital "in planning
and proceeding with the proposed development of an additional
professional building on the Defendant Hospital's property ...
acted knowingly, willfully and in concert with each other, with
the intent and purpose of depriving Plaintiff of its rights to
the continued contractual relations with tenants."
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Under the

authorities cited above, this allegation is far from sufficient.
There are no facts alleged showing any improper means and
Development Company's mere characterizations cannot make proper
conduct improper.

Boyer was perfectly entitled to plan the

building and compete for tenants.

Nor has Development Company

alleged (nor could it consistent with its obligations under Rule
11) that Boyer's predominant purpose was to injure Development
Company.

In essence, all Development Company has alleged in

paragraph 41 is that Boyer and the Hospital acted together
intentionally to solicit tenants.
Finally, Development Company was granted leave to amend
this claim to attempt to allege additional facts which would be
sufficient to state a claim for relief. Apparently recognizing
that it had no facts to support this claim, Development Company
decided not to amend, but rather elected to stand on the vague
conclusory allegations contained in its original Complaint.
The Third Cause of Action falls far short of stating a
claim and was properly dismissed by the district court.

CONCLUSION

The

Hospital

and

Development

Company

and

its

predecessors were very careful to document in writing all of
their agreements over the years. There is no allegation in the
Complaint that Development Company or its predecessors were not
represented by counsel or were unsophisticated or unable to
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protect themselves in their negotiations with the Hospital. The
agreements between the parties contain many obligations and
covenants on the part of Development Company and the Hospital,
However, no matter how many of the provisions of the agreements
which Development Company attempts to cite in order to give some
plausible basis for its attempt to restrict the Hospital from
the use of its own property, one fact is pre-eminent, and that
is, that the Hospital never agreed to restrict its use of its
adjacent property and Development Company never bargained for,
paid for or obtained such an agreement.
Development Company is not entitled to be protected from
legitimate
entitled

competition

from

to be protected

Development Company.

Boyer any more than

from

legitimate

Boyer

competition

is

from

Development Company's remedy is not to

seek a monopoly from the courts, but rather to do a better job
with its buildings.
The district court's Order of Dismissal

should be

affirmed.
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